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Interest of Amicru 
The American Civil Liberties Union, of which the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union of Ohio and the New York Civil 
Liberties Union are affiliates, is a national organization of 
persons dedicated to the preservation of a free and open 
society, principally through the protections embodied in 
our Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
The formulation of standards of criminal due process 
consistent with the imperatives of individual liberty in an 
·ordered society has long been a Yital function of this Court. 
The entire spectrum of the rights of the accused has de-
manded, and quite properly received, its ever-increasing 
attention. Nowhere, however, is the relationship between 
the accused and prosecutorial government more critical 
than at the very inception of the criminal process-at the 
point of arrest and accompa~ying search-an area tradi-
tionally safeguarded by the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The instant cases involve the application of the Fourth 
Amendment to on-the-street detention and interrogation, 
(known in street vernacular as "stop and frisk,").1 In the 
opinion of the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
1 The use by arnici of the term "stop and frisk" throughout this 
brief is occasioned by its brevity. Wherever generally used, and 
as used here, the phrase has come to mean on-the-street detention 
for purposes of police interrogation, accompanied by a search of 
the person of the suspect, ostensibly for the purpose of protecting 
the safety of the police officer. In the absence of probable cause, 
the subsequent use of incriminating evidence so obtained to convict 
the suspect of a crime, demonstrates that, under some circum-
stances, a policeman's suspicion, like virtue, is its own reward. 
465 
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ment, "No matter is more important to police-comm.unity 
relations than the manner in which police officers talk to 
people on the street." 2 The failure, in the name of police 
efficiency, to compel constitutional conduct in this sphere 
is, in the long view, inefficient as well as unconstitutional-
it serves only to discredit the entire system of law enforce-
ment in the eyes of the community which it serves and 
upon which it must ultimately depend to combat crime. 
It is in the hope that in some measure amici may be 
of assistance to the Court in performing its delicate task 
in the instant case of weighing "the social need that 
crime shall be repressed" 3 against "the social need that 
the law will not be flouted by the insolence of office"' that 
this brief is filed. 
The written consent of the parties to this appearance 
by amici has been obtained and filed with the Clerk of the 
Court. 
Statement ·of the Case 
Terry and Chilton 
On October 31, 1963, at about 2 :30 p.m., in broad daylight, 
petitioners were seen on a busy street in the business dis-
trict in downtown Cleveland, Ohio (R. 12, 116). A plain-
clothes police officer (R. 122), assigned to stores and pick-
pockets in the do,vntown area (R. 106), observed their be-
havior for a period of about ten minutes (R. 13) from a 
2 Task Force Report : The Police 180 ( 1967). 
3 Cardozo, J. in People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 24, 150 N. E. 
585, 589 (1926). 
'Ibid. 
4 
vantage point across the street approximately 300 to 400 
feet away (R. 12). He noted that petitioners, both Negroes, 
were walking back and forth on the sidewalk in front of a 
row of stores, peering in the windows of one of several 
stores (R. 23, 119) and returning to the corner, when they 
engaged in conversation with each other, and ultimately 
with a third man, a white man, who joined them later (R. 
13, 22). Although he had no previous information about 
them (R. 119), did not know them (R. 119), and admitted 
that there was nothing unusual about their dress or ap-
pearance (R. 120) or their gait (R. 15, 121), ·he "sus-
pected they were waiting for an opportunity to pull a stick-
up" (R. 138) despite the fact that he had never arrested 
anyone before for a prospective "stick-up" (R. 160) nor 
had he ever in his entire thirty-five years of experience 
as a detective observed anyone "casing a place" for pro-
spective misconduct (R. 46). 
He subsequently testified that he "didn't like them (R. 
118) or "their actions" (R. 42)_, that he "was just attracted 
to them and• • • surmised that there was something going 
on" (R. 47), and that he did not know whether if he saw 
them engaged in the identical conduct again he would have 
had any cause for suspicion (R. 47). 
In any event, when the police officer saw the three men 
com.-ersing, he ran across the street (R. 121) and in the 
ordinary pedestrian traffic of a busy street in a commercial 
district during business hours (R. 124), accosted petitioners 
and the other man (R. 16). He said he was a police officer 
but did not show his badge (R. 122), or identify himself 
further (R. 123). He asked the men their names (R. 16, 
123), and they responded with alacrity (R. 16). Where-
upon the police officer grasped petitioner Terry, turned 
467 
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him around and patted the outside of his topcoat, felt the 
outlines of a weapon, reached into the upper left hand in. 
side pocket of his topcoat, felt the handle of a gun, and, 
when he could not pull the gun out of the pocket easily, 
pulled the topcoat off petitioner and seized the weapon (R. 
16, 124). The police officer then ordered the three men into 
a nearby store (R. 13, 125), shouted to the storekeeper to 
"call the wagon" (R. 125 )-at which point the police officer 
conceded all three men were under arrest, Terry for carry-
ing a concealed weapon (R. 33), the other two for "associa-
tion with him" (R. 131). While they had their hands raised 
above their heads, the police officer proceeded to search 
petitioner Chilton and the other man (R. 17), and dis-
covered and seized a gun in the outer left hand pocket of 
Chilton's coat (R.17, 19). Search of the other man revealed 
no weapons (R. 17) . .All three men were transported to the 
police station (R. 134). Petitioners were charged initially 
with "investigation" and then with carrying concealed 
weapons in violation of Section 2923.01 Ohio Revised Code 
(R. 129). 
The trial judge, after expressly rejecting the contention 
of the prosecution that the seizure of the weapons was pur-
suant to a lawful arrest (R. 100), overruled defense motions 
to suppress on the ground that "the guns [were] the fruit 
of the frisk, and not of a search" (R. 98). 
P~ters 
On July 10, 1964 at about 1 :00 p.m.~ Samuel Lasky, a 
New York City Policeman, at the time off-duty, heard a 
noise at the door of his apartment in Mount Vernon. He 
looked through the peephole of the door and saw appellant 
Peters and another man "tiptoeing" down the hallway (R. 
6 
15). Although Lasky's apartment building houses approxi-
mately 120 tenants (R. 14), when Lasky didn't recognize the 
men he called police headquarters to report the incident 
(R. 15). He then returned to the peephole and saw the two 
men still tiptoeing down the hall toward a stairway (R. 15). 
With his service gun in hand he ran down the hallway and 
down the stairs after the two men. Lasky apprehended 
Peters as the latter was "walking in a rapid way" down 
the stairway away from him (R. 15, 19). 
Seizing Peters by the shirt collar (R. 16, 20), Lasky 
questioned him at gunpoint (R. 18) as to what he was doing 
in the building. There is no testimony in the record which 
would indicate that Lasky was in any danger of any kind 
as he held Peters at gun point. Peters said that he was 
looking for a girl friend. When asked for her name, he 
stated that she was a married woman and declined to name 
her (R. 21). Lasky then "frisked" Peters (R. 21), felt a 
hard object in Peters' right pants pocket, and took out an 
opaque plastic envelope (R. 17,_18). In the envelope, Lasky 
found ''6 picks and 2 Allen wrenches with the short leg filed 
down to a screwdriver edge, and a tension bar" (R. 17). 
Peters was then arrested by City of Mount Vernon Police 
who arrived in response to Lasky's earlier telephone call. 
After indictment for illegal possession of burglar's tools, 
defendant's motion for the suppression of the evidence 
seized by Lasky during the "frisk" was denied (R. 3-4). 
Sibron 
On March 9, 1965, Patrolman Anthony Martin of the 
New York Police apprehended Sibron in a restaurant in 
Brooklyn. Officer Martin, in uniform, ordered Sibron to 
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step outside. As Sibron left the restaurant, the officer 
stated, "You know what I am after" (R. 16). Sibron and 
the officer then, more or less simultaneously, reached into 
Sibron's jacket pocket where the officer grabbed several 
packets of narcotics (R. 16-17). The officer did not have 
a search warrant (R. 9-10). 
Officer Martin testiiied that on ::\farch 9th, over a period 
of eight hours, he had observed Sibron in conver·sation 
with six or eight persons who he knew to be drug addicts 
(R. 13-15). When Sibron went into the restaurant, Officer 
Martin saw him speaking ·with three other known addicts 
(R. 15). He did not know what any of the conversations 
were about (R. 18). He then called Sibron from the res-
taurant, questioned and searched him, and discovered the 
packets of heroin (R. 16-17). 
A motion to suppress the eYidence was denied (R. 20). 
In the view of aniici, although some factual distinctions 
among these cases might be made, they are distinctions 
without a constitutional difference and all are entitled to 
reversal for the same legal reasons. .Accordingly, amici 
have consolidated their legal arguments for reversal of all 
three cases in the balance of this brief. 
8 
Argument 
The instant cases present for review examples of a grow-
ing trend of state court decisions5 and statutes6 authorizing 
police to stop, question, and "frisk" or search "suspicious 
persons" without probable cause to belieYe that the suspect 
5 California: People v. Garrett, 238 Cal. App. 2d 292, 47 Cal. 
Rptr. 731 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Feople v. Michelson, 59 Cal. 
2d 448, 450-51 (1963); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Ballou, 
217 N. E. 2d 187 (1966); New York: People v. Pugach, 15 N. Y. 2d 
65, 204 N. E. 2d 176, cert. den. 380 U. S. 936 (1965); People v. 
Rivera, 14 N. Y. 2d 441, 201 N. E. 2d 32, cert. denied 379 U. S. 
978 (1964); New Jersey: State v. Dilley, 49 N. J. 460 (1967); 
Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Hicks, 223 .A. 2d 873 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1966). But see United States v. l\Iargeson, 259 F. Supp. 256 
(E. D. Pa. 1966) and cases cited at footnote 22 infra. 
6 N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 180-a, >rhich is raised for review in 
Nos. 63 and 74. A "Stop and Search" bill was introduced in the 
Ohio legislature early in the 1967 session and defeated after a 
vigorous floor debate. See Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 23, 1967, 
p. 4 col. 3. A similar fate was met by recently proposed statutes 
in Illinois (H. B. 10i8) and Mic}:iigan (S. B. 74:7). See, Frisking 
in the Absence of Sufficient Grounds for Arrest as a Common Police 
Practice Today, 1965 U. ILL. L. F. 119, 127; see also, .A.:r.IERICAN LAw 
INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF PREARR.AIGN)IEXT PROCEDURE § 2.02 
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966); A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S .COMMIS-
SION ON L.AW EXFORCE~fENT AND THE .A.DMIXISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 
THE CHALLEXGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 1. C S. Govt. Printing 
Office, Feb. 1967). 
Section 180-a of the N. Y. Code of Criminal Procedure is modeled 
upon the Uniform • .\.rrest Act promulgated more than twenty years 
ago by the Interstate Commission on Crime. See \Varner, "The 
Uniform Arrest Act", 28 U. Va. L. Rev. 315 (1942). Statutes 
modeled on the Uniform Arrest Act have been enacted in New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Delaware. X. H. Laws, §§ 594 :2-3 
( 1955) ; R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 12-7-1 ( 1965) ; Del. Code Ann. Tit. 
11, § 1902 ( 1953). Similar legislation has also been enacted in 
Hawaii, Massachusetts and the City of Miami, Florida. Rev. Laws 
of Hawaii, Tit. 30, ch. 255, §§ 4-5 (1955); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 41, 
§ 98 (1961); Code of City of Miami, Florida, § 43-46 (1957), as 
amended by Ord. Xo. 7,367 (1965). 
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has committed a crime. Unless this Court acts, this trend 
will effectively emasculate the shield of probable cause 
which the Fourth Amendment has heretofore interposed 
between the legitimate investigative function of the police 
and the right of the individual to be let alone. 
It cannot be doubted that for many years, state police 
officers have been stopping and frisking suspects, without 
their consent, without a search warrant or probable cause, 
and using the yield of such searches to convict them of 
crimes. The constitutionality of such police practice has 
been in doubt at least since Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 
(1949), which applied the core of the Fourth Amendment 
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth. The evidence so seized has been constitutionally 
inadmissible in state criminal cases since Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U. S. 643 (1961} as a result of the elevation of the 
federal exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 
U. S. 383 (1914), to a constitutional command. And when 
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1.964) made it clear that federal 
standards of arrest, including the constitutional condition 
precedent of probable cause, set the minimal requirements 
of valid state arrest as well, the constitutional threat to 
continued state police "stop and frisk" activity was evi-
dent. 
The decisions and statutes which have upheld the validity 
of "stops and frisks" have reasoned ( i) that a "stop"-a 
compulsory detention by the police for purposes of interro-
gation-is not an arrest requiring probable cause for its 
validity, but a species of sub-arrest or non-arrest to which 
none of the constitutional requirements of arrest apply and 
which may lawfully be effected on "suspicion" or "reason-
10 
able suspicion" of past or even future crimes, and (ii) that 
a ''frisk"-which the courts have frequently defined as "the 
patting of the exterior of one's clothing in order to detect 
by touch the presence of a concealed weapon" 1-is a "lesser 
degree" invasion of privacy than a "full-blown search of 
the person" and is accordingly "reasonable" within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when effected incident 
to a "stop" and when the policeman "suspects" (although 
without probable cause) that the frisk is necessary for his 
self protection. In No. 67, the lower court added the fur-
ther novel observation that even if the frisk was unconsti-
tutional, the raison d'etre of the exclusionary rule of Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961) does not require the product 
of the frisk to be barred from evidence since "a judicial 
rule rendering evidence produced as the result of a 'frisk' 
inadmissible would fail to deter the police from 'frisking' 
suspects believed to be armed, as police 'frisk' for their 
own protection rather than for the purpose of looking for 
evidence." 8 
Tenuous as the foregoing reasoning is, the lower courts 
have in practice applied the "stop and frisk" doctrine so as 
to reduce their own stated requirement of "reasonable sus-
picion" to mere "intuition," and to validate arrests which 
are more than mere temporary detentions, and general 
searches which are more than mere "frisks" and which have 
no relation whatever to the self-protection needs of the 
police officer. 
7 People v. Peters, 18 N. Y. 2d 238, 245 (1966); People v. Rivera, 
14 N. Y. 2d 441, 446 (1964); State v. Terry, 214 N. E. 2d at 120. 
But see People v. Taggart, --N. Y. 2d -- (July 7, 1967). 
8 214 N. E. 2d 121. 
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Thus, in No. 74, the New York Court of Appeals defined 
the "reasonable suspicion" required for stop and frisk 
under Section 180-a of the N. Y. Code of Criminal Proce-
dure in the broadest possible terms as constituting the mere 
intuition of the experienced police officer: 
"By requiring the reasonable suspicion of a police officer, 
the statute incorporates the experienced police officer~s 
intuitive knowledge and appraisal of criminal activity. 
His evaluation of the various factors involved insures 
a protective, as well as definitive, standard" 18 N. Y. 
2d at 245. (Emphasis added.) 
Judge Van Voorhis accurately defined the scope of ~180-a 
and the New York case law in his dissent in No. 63 belo,Y, 
as follows: 
"The power to frisk is practically unlimited, inas-
much as whether an officer 'reasonably suspects' that 
someone is committing, has committed or is about to 
commit a felony necessarily depends to a large extent 
upon the subjective operations of the mind of the offi-
cer" 18 N. Y. 2d 605.& 
In No. 74, the lower court upheld the forcible apprehen-
sion of appellant Peters at gunpoint as a mere "frisk" 
since no formal arrest was made. Yet the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey has since held that a "stop", not an arrest, 
occurred even where the officer formally advised the accused 
that he was under arrest. The Court observed: 
9 Indeed, the lower courts in No. 6i and No. 74 implied that a 
person is protected from detention and search under the "stop 
and frisk" doctrine only where his activities are "perfectly normal". 
See People v. Peters, 18 N. Y. 2d at 246 and 254 N. Y. Supp. 2d 
at 13; State v. Terry, 214 N. E. 2d at 118. 
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" ... it seems evident to us that the legality of incidental 
street detention for purposes of summary inquiry 
should not be permitted to turn on whether it is for-
mally labelled as an arrest but rather on whether it 
was reasonable in the light of the circumstances." State 
v. Dilley, 49 N. J. 460, 467-68 (1967). 
Moreover, ~'frisks" have not been limited to "the patting 
of the exterior of one's clothing". In No. 74, the frisk of 
appellant was completed when he felt a hard object in ap-
pellant's pocket and withdrew an opaque envelope from 
the pocket. The officer \Vent further, however, and searched 
the envelope. Similarly~ in No. 63, the New York Court of 
Appeals held valid a so-called frisk where "the officer put 
his hand into the suspect's pocket" (18 N. Y. 2d 604). In 
People v. Taggart, -- N. Y. 2d -- (July 7, 1967), the 
New York Court of Appeals explicitly acknowledged that 
the so-called "frisks" in these cases were "searches" and 
explicitly held that §180-a of the New York Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure authorized searches of the person without 
probable cause. 
Finally, although the stop and frisk doctrine has been 
rationalized on the basis of the self-defense needs of the 
police officer, lower courts have not limited the doctrine to 
circumstances where a frisk is genuinely necessary for the 
protection of the policeman. In Ko. 7 4 there is not one 
shred of evidence that the officer reasonably-or even un-
reasonably-believed he was in any danger as he held ap-
pellant Peters by the collar, at gun point, and questioned 
him. Moreover, any danger that may have existed in that 
situation was removed at the moment when the officer re-
moved the opaque envelope from appellant's pocket. There 
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existed no further possible danger to justify the officer's 
opening the envelope and examining its contents.10 There 
is a similar complete lack of evidence of danger to the offi-
cers in Nos. 67 and 63. As Judge Van Voorhis noted in his 
dissent in No. 63 below, the authorization to search granted 
to the police in New York has been defined so broadly that 
"the safety of the officer or public from Yiolence is not 
remotely involved". 18 N. Y. 2d 607. 
Amici urge that (I) the detentions and interrogations 
in the three cases at bar were arrests or "seizures of per-
sons" within the purview of the Fourth Amendment, as 
applied to the states through the Fourteenth, and that they 
were invalid by operation of that same constitutional au-
thority; (II) the "frisks'' were searches within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states 
through the Fourteenth, and invalid by that same author-
ity; and (III) the use of the yield of the searches in evi-
dence against the defendants cannot be justified by the 
public policy of protecting the safety of police officers. 
Each of these contentions will be considered in sequence 
below. 
10 Similarly, in People v. Pugach, 15 N. Y. 2d 65 (1965), cert. 
deil. 380 U. S. 936 ( 1965), where the police searched the defendant's 
briefcase before taking him to the police station for questioning, any 
possible danger to the police from a weapon in the briefcase could 
have been elimi:..1ated by the simple expedient of keeping the brief-
case away from the defendant in the front seat of the police car, and 
no search of the briefcase ·was necessary. See 15 N. Y. 2d at 71 
(Fuld, J., dissenting). 
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I. 
The detentions and interrogations were illegal seizures 
of the person. 
This Court has repeatedly held that the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibits any arrest without "probable cause".11 In 
the context of the instant cases, it is well to bear in mind 
that this prohibition is based upon the Fourth Amend-
ment's restrictions on "seizures" of "persons": 
" . . . it is the command of the Fourth Amendment 
that no warrants for either searches or arrests shall 
issue except 'upon probable cause, supported by oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.' " 
Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 100 (1959) 
Thus, it is clear that the well settled requirement of prob-
able cause extends to all seizures of the person and is not 
limited to "arrests" in some restricted, formal sense as 
the courts below have held.12 
. Each of the so-ralbd "stops" in the instant cases un-
questionably constituted an unlawful seizure of the person 
in violation of the Fourth .<\mendment. 
11 See \Yong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Rios 
v. United States, 364 U. S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States, 
361 U. S. 98 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949); Carroll 
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
12 See also Souris, Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search-The Use 
or Misuse of the Euphemisms, 57 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 251, 257; 
Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity and the Law 
of Arrest, 51 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 402, 403-04. 
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There is ample authority for the contention that at the 
moment Terry and Sibron were first stopped and ques-
tioned by a police officer -;;ono identified himself as such-
at the moment they wer~ rcztrained of their liberty of mo-
tion by a law enforce:!:!:lc::nt 2.~thority of the state-they 
were under arrest for erJ~titY.tional purposes.13 Henry v. 
United States, 361 U. S. !":13~ :03 (1959) so holds. Those 
who seek to avoid the con~r::qn~nces of the Henry "moment 
of restriction of liberty~~ .rule rJi arrest urge that the Gov-
ernment concession in H ~nry tb.at the arrest took place at 
the moment of the "stop:~ limits that decision to its par-
ticular facts. Such attempts to dilute the holding of Henry 
fail to consider the fact that although the Court \vas not 
bound by the Government::-: concession,14 it viewed the facts 
of the case independently and concluded that "[w]hen the 
officers interrupted the two m<::n and restricted their liberty 
of movement, the arrest • • • \Vas complete." 15 There is 
substantial lower court authority to support this interpreta-
tion of Henry.16 
13 It might parenthetically hr~ nrJtr'd that the authority granted 
a police officer under the instant r:as<:s to stop and question suspects 
raises senarate substantial r:ur:stirJns under Miranda Y. Arizona 
. . ' 384 U.S. 436 (1966), should an attr:mpt be made to introduce the 
suspect's response to such r;ur.:sti<min~ in evidence. See also Reich, 
Police Questioning of Lau:-Abvling Citizens, 75 Yale L. J. 1161 
(1966). 
14 361 U.S. at 105 (Clark, .J., dissr:nting). 
15 Id. at 103. Cf. Rios v. "'Cnite<l States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960). 
16 See United States v. Baxtc,r, 361 F. 2d 116 (6th Cir. 1966), 
cert. den. 385 U. S. 134 ( 1966) ; Seals v. United States, 325 F. 2d 
1006 (D. C. Cir. 1963) ; rnited States v. Viale, 312 F. 2d 595, 601 
(2nd Cir. 1963); Kelly v. "Cnited States, 298 F. 2d 310 (D. C. 
Cir. 1961) ; Coleman '· rnitr<l States, 295 F. 2d 555 (D. C. Cir. 
1961), cert. den. 369 u. S. 813 ( 1962); Green v. United States, 
259 F. 2d 180 (D. C. Cir. 1058), eert. den. 359 U. S. 917 ( 1959) ; 
16 
In any case, there can be little doubt that once a police 
officer lays hands on a suspect and forceably restrains his 
movement or exacts involuntary movement from him, an 
''arrest" or "seizure" for constitutional purposes has oe-
curred, and philosophic and semantic distinctions between 
"arrest" and "detention" become (if they have not always 
been) hopelessly irrelevant. See Henry v. United States, 
361 u. s. 98, 104 (1959): 
"Under our system suspicion is not enough for an 
officer to lay hands on a citizen." 
See also United States v. Rios, 364 U. S. 253, where, in 
remanding the cases for resolution of a conflict in testi-
mony, this Court held that if a police officer approached a 
suspect with his revolver drawn and "took hold of the 
defendant's arm" (364 U. S. at 257-58) before the officer 
had probable cause to make .an arrest, an unconstitutional 
arrest or seizure of the person had occurred. 364 U. S. at 
261-62.17 
United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837 (D. D. C. 1957); Long 
Y. Ansell, 69 F. 2d 386 (D. C. Cir. 1934) ; United States v. Mitchell, 
179 F. Supp. 636 (D. D. C. 1959); Turney v. Rhoades, 42 Ga. App. 
104, 155 S. E. 112 (1930). 
See also Foote, The Fourth .Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity 
and the Law of .Arrest, 51 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 402 (1960). 
But see contra: Vnited States Y. Thomas. 250 F. Supp. 771 
(S. D. X. Y. 1966); United States v. Vita. 294 F. 2d 524 (2d 
Cir. 1961), cert. denied 369 U. S. 823 (1962); Busby v. United 
States, 296 F. 2d 328 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Bonanno, 
180 F. Supp. 71 (S. D. :N". Y. 1960) rev'd on other grounds sub nom.; 
United States Y. Bufalino, 285 F. 2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960). 
1 ~ And see Green v. United States, 259 F. 2d 180, 182 (D. C. Cir. 
1958), cert. den. 359 U. S. 917 ( 1959) : "Had he remained standing 
where he was first accosted, or had he merely refused to talk, the 
police would have lacked probable cause either to arrest or to 
search him. The officers would have had no justifiable reason 
to lay hands upon him." 
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If the protections of privacy derived from the Fourth 
Amendment are to remain meaningful, if they are not to 
be diluted beyond recognition and beyond the legitimate 
needs of law enforcement, Fourth Amendment standards 
should be applied in each instance of governmental re-
straint of the person of its citizenry, no matter how fleet-
ing, without the substitution of semantic devices for con-
stitutional requirements. For careful analysis "exposes 
the thinness of the claim that investigative arrests are 
essential to public safety. On the contrary, the practice 
of investigative arrests breeds resentment, discourages 
thorough police work, and sets an official standard of law-
lessness." 18 
II. 
The frisks were illegal searches • 
.Amici have urged that arrests or seizures of the person 
for purposes of constitutional analysis occurred before the 
"frisks," that they were invalid arrests or seizures in the 
absence of probable cause to make them, and that the sup-
pression of evidence obtained incidental thereto was there-
fore constitutionally compelled. If the Court so holds, the 
legal analysis in these cases is over. For it has never been 
seriously contended that a non-consensual warrantless 
search, without independent probable causP- to search, may 
be justified by a contemporaneous unconstitutional arrest. 
But even if this court should somehow affirm the posi-
tion taken by the courts below and hold that the "stopping" 
18 Joint Comm. on the District of Columbia. Crime in the District 
of Columbia, H. R. Rep. No. 176, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 139 (1965) 
(minority views) . 
18 
of some or all of the petitioners and appellants in the in-
stant cases constituted an "investigatory detention" which 
is not itself in violation of the Fourth Amendment, such a 
non-arrest cannot validate under the Fourth Amendment 
the frisks of petitioners and appellants which occurred. 
The Fourth Amendnment, as construed by this Court, does 
not merely prohibit searches incident to unlawful arrests; 
heretofore any search without a warrant, based upon prob-
able cause has been considered lawful only if made inci-
dent to a lawful arrest made upon probable cause. E.g. 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 112, n. 3, 122 (1964); 
Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253, 261-64 (1960). There 
is no authority whatever justifying any search on the basis 
of its being reasonably incident to an "investigatory de-
tention" made on less than probable cause. 
The attempted constitutional justification which has been 
advanced for the "frisk" is even more tenuous than the 
constitutional sanction advanced for the ''stop." The at-
tempt to exempt the "frisk" fJ;"om the Fourth Amendment 
protections has taken two forms. First, by semantic al-
chemy, it is denied that a "frisk" is a search within the 
operation of the Fourth Amendment. Second, even where 
it is conceded that, '\Yithin the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, the "stop" is a seizure of the person and the 
"frisk" is a search, both the "stop'' and incidental "frisk" 
are sought to be justified, in the absence of probable cause, 
as "reasonable searches and seizures," under a test of "rea-
sonableness" which, it is argued, is an interchangeable 
alternative to the requirement of probable cause.19 
Each of these arguments '\Vill be discussed below. 
19 The American Law Institute has taken this view. See MODEL 
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966). 
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A. A. "Frisk" ls a Search Within the Meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment 
The suggestion that a police officer who runs his hand~ 
over the outside clothing on the body of a suspect in the 
public street without his consent for the express purpose 
of determining what the suspect has concealed inside his 
clothing is conducting, not a search, but a frisk-a form of 
non-search or sub-search which defies Fourth Amendment 
proscription-would be ludicrous if its consequences were 
not so destructive of "the right to be let alone." 20 
Judge Fuld, dissenting in People v. Rivera, has properly 
destroyed this attempted distinction: 
"This is nothing but an exercise in semantics; a search 
by any other name is still a search. Viewed in the 
perspective of constitutionally protected interests, a 
police tactic-call it a search or, more euphemistically, 
a 'frisk'-which leads to discovery of a gun in an in-
dividual's pocket by trespassing on his person is indis-
putably an invasion of privacy. A 'frisk' is a species 
of search and, in point of fact, both decisions and 
dictionaries so define it • • • . 
"Free men should no more be subject to having the 
police run their hands over their pockets than through 
them. :N"either the Fourth Amendment nor, for that 
matter, the common law of tort distinguishes • • * 
between a cursory search and a more elaborate one. 
In both instances, it is the slightest touching which is 
condemned, and the reason for this is the insult 
20 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). 
20 
to individuality, to individual liberty, is as grave and 
as objectionable in the one case as in the other." 21 
Indeed, in People v. Taggart, -- N. Y. 2d -- (July 
7, 1967), the New York Court of Appeals abandoned its 
distinction between a "frisk" and a "search" and explicitly 
held that ~180-a of the New York Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure authorized searches of the person incident to "stops" 
made on less than probable cause. 
The governing principle that any invasion of privacy 
is subject to constitutional protection was clearly stated as 
long ago as Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886). 
In Boyd, where the Court struck down a statute requiring 
importers to produce certain invoices or admit the govern-
ment's allegations as to the contents of the invoices, this 
Court discussed Lord Camden's decision in Entick v. Car-
rington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, and concluded, 116 U. S. at 
630: 
"The principles laid down in this opinion affect the 
very essence of constitutional liberty and security. 
They reach farther than the concrete form of the case 
then before the court, with its adventitious circum-
stances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the 
government and its employees of the sanctity of a 
man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the 
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his 
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but 
it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal 
security, personal liberty and private property, where 
21 People v. Rivera, 14 N. Y. 2d 441, 449-450, 201 N. E. 2d 32, 
37, 252 N. Y. S. 2d 458, 466 (1964), cert. denied 379 U. S. 978 
(1964). 
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that right has never been forfeited by his conviction 
of some public off ense,-it is the invasion of this sacred 
right which underlies and constitutes the essence of 
Lord Camden's judgment. Breaking into a house and 
opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggra-
vation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of 
a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be 
used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit 
his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment. 
In this regard, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run 
almost into each other." 
The Court further noted that 
"constitutional provisions for the security of person and 
property should be liberally construed. . . . It is the 
duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional 
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroach-
ments thereon." Id. p. 635. 
It is obvious that the patting of the exterior of one's cloth-
ing is an invasion into the "privacies of life", "personal 
security", and "personal liberty", and that, under the Boyd 
and Entick decisions, it is this invasion "that constitutes the 
essence of the offense" while any distinctions of degree 
which may exist between such a "frisk" and a "full-blown 
search" are merely differences as to the "circumstances of 
aggravation". 
It is noteworthy that the specific portions of the Boyd 
decisions quoted above were reaffirmed in Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U. S. 643, 646-67 (1961), and more recently in Berger v. 
United States, 388 U. S. 41 (1967).22 
22 Several lower courts have squarely held that a frisk of an 
accused for weapons is indistinguishable from a "full-blown search" 
22 
The attempt to withdraw searches of any particular 
variety from the operation of the Fourth Amendment by 
a process of nomenclature and classification is both sterile 
and dangerous. Calling a search a "frisk" and excluding 
it from Fourth .Amendment controls because of its label 
is a form of non-analysis which will survive neither logic, 
common experience, nor the decided case law of this Court 
in the area of individual privacy. The greatest danger of 
such a device, however, is its destructive effect upon one 
of the basic guarantees which a society, if it is to remain 
free, must provide each citizen-the right to walk the pub-
lic streets secure in the knowledge that, without probable 
cause to do so, the police cannot put their hands on his or 
her body for any purpose. 
B. A "Frisk" in the A.baence of Probable Carue la 
Not a Reaaonable Search Within the Meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment 
Once it has been determined that a frisk is, in fact and 
law, a search within the operation of the Fourth Amend-
ment, those who seek constitutional justification for police 
frisks without either a contemporaneous arrest or a search 
warrant based upon probable cause, urge that such frisks 
of the accused's person. In White v. United States, 271 F. 2d 829 
(D. C. Cir., 1959), the court held that a law enforcement officer 
had violated the accused's constitutional rights where: 
"The officer had no warrant of any kind and no probable cause 
to accost appellant, require him to place his hands in a cer-
tain position, and frisk him." 
In State v. Collins, 150 Conn. 488, 491-92, the court held: 
"The 'frisking' of the defendant, as he stood against the car, 
to see if he was armed was also a search of the person." 
See also Ellis v. United States, 264 F. 2d 372, 374 (D. C. Cir. 1959) 
cert. den. 359 U. S. 948; People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 871-72, 
194 N. Y. S. 326, 331-32 (1922). 
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are "reasonable" police conduct whenever they are based 
upon the police officer's "suspicion"-which in New York, 
at least, may be a purely "intuitive" one-that the subject 
of the ·search has committed a crime or is about to commit 
a crime in fiituro and that the police officer may be in 
danger. Since the Fourth Amendment prohibits only "un-
reasonable" searches and seizures (the argument runs) the 
reasonableness of the police conduct is a constitutionally 
adequate substitute for probable cause, and the "frisk" is 
therefore a valid search. 
This contention, although novel, flatly contradicts a 
wealth of authority construing the Fourth Amendment. 
More importantly, the adoption of such a construction of 
the Fourth Amendment would effectively eviscerate the 
right of privacy the Amendment was designed to protect. 
This Court has unmistakably held on numerous occasions 
that any search of the person of an accused without a war-
rant is constitutional only if made incident to an arrest 
based upon "probable cause" to believe that the accused 
has committed a crime. ~3 The historical roots of the re-
quirement of probable cause were explored at length in 
Henry v. United States, 361 L". S. 98, 100-102 (1959). Since 
the stop and frisk doctrine purports to authorize searches 
on "suspicion", "reasonable suspicion" or even "intuition", 
it is relevant to note that in the Henry case this Court spe-
cifically held : 
23 This Court has never used the "reasonableness" test to take the 
place of probable cause as a necessary element of a lawful arrest 
or search. In United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), 
this Court enunciated the "reasonableness:' test solely for the pur-
pose of determining whether, after an arrest pursuant to a valid 
warrant, a showing of probable cause to search was sufficient to 
preclude the necessity of obtaining a search warrant as well. 
24 
"As the early American decisions both before and imme-
diately after its [the Fourth Amendment's] adoption 
show, common rumor or report, suspicion, or even 
'strong reason to suspect' was not adequate to support 
a warrant for arrest. And that principle has survived 
to this day ... It was against this background that 
scholars recently wrote, 'Arrest on mere suspicion col-
lides violently with the basic human right of liberty'. 
. . . 'Vhile a search without a warrant is, within 
limits, permissible if incident to a lawful arrest, if an 
arrest without a warrant is to support an incidental 
search, it must be made with probable cause." (361 
U. S. 101-102) (emphasis added). 
The basic constitutional requirement of "probable cause" is 
clearly stated in Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963), a 
case which has been cited by proponents of the stop and 
frisk doctrine for the proposition that: 
"A State is not precluded from 'developing workable 
rules' governing searches to meet 'the practical de-
mands of effecfrrn criminal investigations and law en-
forcement' if the State does not violate the constitu-
tional standard of what is reasonable." 2 • 
Although the majority cf this Court divided evenly on ap-
plying the Fourth Amendment's constitutional criteria to 
the facts of the Ker case, eight of the nine justices unequiv-
ocally agreed that probable cause is an absolute necessity 
for any search. Mr. Justice Clark, with the concurrence of 
Justices Black, Stewart, and White, observed: 
2 ~ People v. Rivera, 14 N. Y. 2d 441, 448 (1964); see also People 
v. Peters, 18 N. Y. 2d 238, 247 (1966); State v. Terry, 214 N. E . 2d 
714, 121-22 (1966); State v. Dilley, 49 N. J . 460, 470 (1967). 
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"The evidence at issue, in order to be admissible, must 
be the product of a search incident to a lawful arrest, 
since the officer had no search warrant. The lawfulness 
of the arrest without a warrant, in turn, must be based 
upon probable cause .. . " (374 U. S. at 34-35). 
And Mr. Justice Brennan noted in an opinion in ·which the 
Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas, and l\Ir. Justice Gold-
berg concurred : 
"It is much too late in the day to deny that a lawful 
entry is as essential to vindication of the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment as for example, probable 
cause to arrest or a search warrant for a search not 
incident to an arrest" (374 U. S. at 53). 
In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964) both the majority 
and dissenting justices of this Court again agreed that the 
Fourth Amendment requires "probable cause" for any 
search whether with or without a warrant ( 378 U. S. at 112, 
n. 3 and 378 U. S. at 122): 
Thus, our analysis of the "frisk" as a Fourth Amend-
ment violation returns to its place of beginning. A frisk 
must be a search as that term is used in the Fourth Amend-
ment. And as a search it cannot be a reasonable search 
unless it is accompanied by probable cause to arrest or 
search. Since, in the cases at bar, neither probable cause 
to ai"rest nor probable cause to search could be shown, ex-
cept by use of the yield of the frisk itself, the frisks them-
selves were unreasonable searches and their yield should 
have been suppressed by command of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
26 
m. 
Protection of police officers cannot justify the use of 
the yield of the frisk in evidence against petitioners. 
Amici have demonstrated (Argument II, supra) that a 
frisk for weapons ''ithout probable cause to arrest or 
search is an unreasonable search expressly prohibited by 
the Fourth Amendment. It follows that the yield of such 
a search must be suppressed by virtue of the exclusionary 
rule made applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
u. s. 643 (1961). 
But the sponsors of exceptional constitutional treat-
ment for such frisks urge that society's substantial interest 
in protecting the lives of its law enforcement authorities 
in the course of their investigation of crime compel relaxa-
tion of settled constitutional principles to achieve this im-
portant societal purpose. They urge that such searches 
are necessary for crime investjgation and police protection, 
that they are, therefore, not constitutionally infirm, and 
that, as a result, the exclusionary rule does not reach their 
fruits. Because everyone is quite correctly concerned 
with the safety of the police in the performance of their 
dangerous and highly important function of preserving 
order, the argument has a certain surface appeal. 
Upon closer inspection, however, the argument disinte-
grates entirely. For (A) adequate exceptions for police 
necessity already exist in the Fourth Amendment case 
law, and the addition of new ones in the "stop and frisk" 
sphere is not necessary for the protection of legitimate 
police interests, and (B) as a practical matter, the use 
in evidence of the yield of searches made in violation of 
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clear Fourth Amendment principle would provide great 
incentive for police officers, under the guise of self-protec-
tion, to make general searches of the person, thus frustrat-
ing the great purposes of the Fourth Amendment which 
the exclusionary rule was designed to protect. 
Each of these contentions will be considered below. 
A. There ls No Legitimate Police Need for the "Frisk" 
E%ception to Fourth Amendment Protections 
When police necessity is urged as a ground for legiti-
mizing frisks without probable cause, the listener has the 
unerring feeling that he has heard the argument some-
where before. It was precisely this argument that was made 
to obtain this Court's approval of the warrantless search 
incidental to a valid arrest, an exception to the general re-
quirement that searches must be by warrant.25 
Originating as a dictum justifying the search of the 
person of an accused pursuant to valid arrest,28 it was 
expanded to include the immediate place of arrest21 and 
25 "Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police 
have the right, without a search warrant, to make a contempora-
neous search of the person of the accused for weapons or for the 
fruits of or implements used to commit the crime * * * . This right 
to search and seize without a search warrant extends to things 
under the accused's immediate control * * ,.;, and. to an extent de-
pending- on the circumstances of the case, to the ·place where he is 
arrested * * * ." Preston i.-. United States. 376 'C. S. 364, 367 
(1964). See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 770 (1966); 
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102 (1965); l"nited States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950) ; Harris Y. United States, 331 
U. S. 145 (1947); Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927); 
Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925); Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914). 
28 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
27 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). 
28 
the entire four-room apartment of an accused who was 
arrested in one of the rooms.28 Although the "incidental 
search" exception to the requirement of a warrant has gone 
far beyond its origins and, perhaps, its rationale,29 there is 
no denying the fact that it was originally conceived as a 
means of protecting the arresting officer against attack by 
concealed weapons and as a means of preventing the 
immediate destruction of fruits or instrumentalities of 
crime.80 
Never, until the "stop and frisk" cases, however, has 
there been any claim that an officer may utilize an invalid 
arrest to justify the seizure and use of evidence for which 
he was not entitled to search. 
This Court has never heretofore permitted any relaxa-
tion of the constitutional requirements for searches and 
seizure on the grounds of self-defense of the police officer. 
Any such exception on grounds of expediency would seem 
markedly inconsistent with thi_s Court's many holdings that 
fundamental Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights may not 
be violated in the supposed interests of better law enforce-
28 Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 (1947). 
: 9 See Justice Frankfurter's strong critique of the extension of 
the "incidental search" rule in his dissent in 'Cnited States v. Rabin-
owitz, 339 U. S. 56, 68-86 ( 1950). 
30 "The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified • • • 
by the need to seize weapons and other things "hich might be used 
to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to 
prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime-things which 
might easily happen where the weapon or e\idence is on the ac-
cused's person or under his immediate control." Preston v. United 
States, 376 U. S. 364, 367 (1964); United States v. Ventresca, 380 
U. S. 102 ( 1965). See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 
56, 72 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (1950); Palmer v. United 
States, 203 F. 2d 66, 67 (D. C. Cir. 1953); and Note, 17 BAYLOR 
L. R. 312 (1965). 
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ment or greater public safety. E.g., Miranda v . .Arizona, 
384 U. S. 436, 479-82 (1966); 'JJ{app v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 
659-60 (1961). 
Moreover, the claim that the right to stop and frisk 
without probable cause is necessary for police or public 
safety is at best an unproven one. Cf. Berger v. United 
States, 388 U. S. 41, 60 (1967). As Judge Fuld stated in 
his dissenting opinion in No. 7 4 below: 
"Of course, there are risks inherent in investigatory 
activities undertaken by the police but, certainly, it 
does not follow from that that the police are privileged, 
absent probable cause, to search anyone who looks or 
acts suspiciously and to use against him any articles 
they may find on his person. As I previously observed, 
'Other methods are available whereby the police may 
protect themselves while carrying on their investiga-
tions, other procedures which, if utilized, will safe-
guard the police and the community from the criminal 
minority without destroying the sense of dignity and 
freedom with which the law-abiding majority walk the 
the streets.' (People v. R,ivera, 14 N. Y. 2d 441, 452 
[dissenting opinion], cert. den. 379 U. S. 978.)" 18 
N. Y. 2d at 248.31 
Amici submit that the warrantless search of the person 
and the area within his immediate control permitted in-
cident to a contemporaneous valid arrest is sufficient recog-
nition of the police officer's legitimate need to protect him-
31 Justice Souris of the Supreme Court of Michigan has also ex-
pressed doubts as to the necessity for stop and frisk legislation. 
Souris, Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search-The Use and 
Misuse of Euphemisms, 57 J . Crim. L., C. & P. S. 251 (1966) . 
30 
self, without fashioning new exceptions to Fourth Amend-
ment principle which would eliminate the need for "some 
valid basis in law [to justify] the intrusion'' of arrest or 
search.32 
B. The Deterrent Effect of Strict Application of the 
E%clwionary Rule Will Keep Invasions of Privacy 
to a Practical Minimum 
The Court of Appeals in Terry stood logic upon its head 
by pointing out, as part of its rationale for refusing to 
enforce the exclusionary rule that-even if "stops and 
frisks" without probable cause are unconstitutional-vigor-
ous application of the exclusionary rule in the "stop and 
frisk" area is inappropriate since the rule will have no 
deterrent e:ff ect upon police officers 'Yho, not wishing to 
commit suicide, will continue to frisk suspects for weapons, 
no matter what courts choose to do with the resulting evi-
dence. 33 Such reasoning ignores this Court's clear holding 
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 6~3 (1963), that "the exclusion-
32 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948). 
33 Paraphrasing will not do justice to the reasoning of the 
Court of Appeals on this point. "The Mapp exclusionary rule was 
imposed upon the states not because of some command inherent in 
the fourth amendment, but rather because the Supreme Court be-
lieved that it was the only way the police could be forced to respect 
the fourth amendment. If the police could not obtain a conviction 
using evidence unlawfully obtained, they would have no incentive 
to conduct illegal searches. If we keep in mind this raison d'etre 
of the exclusionary rule, we can guard against confusion in the 
attendant rules that are developed. A judicial rule rendering evi-
dence produced as a result of a frisk inadmissible would fail to 
deter the police from frisking suspects beliered to be armed as 
police frisk for their own protection rather than for the purpose 
of looking for evidence. A rule of admissibility in such cases could 
only result in allowing the armed criminal to go free although 
failing to any meaningful extent to protect individual liberty." 
(Emphasis added.) 
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ary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments" 34 and is not a discretionary rule of 
evidence for courts to apply or withhold from application 
as they deem appropriate. The Court of Appeals' reasoning 
also does not consider the possibility, well evidenced by the 
facts of No. 63 and No. 74,35 that there are law enforcement 
personnel who, in an excess of zeal, engage in general 
searches of the persons of suspects for purposes of general 
harassment and to see what incriminating evidence they 
can find even though they have no reason at all to fear for 
their safety.36 Those of us who are not as convinced that 
the police will use their vast power with such unanimous 
bona fides, but who adhere instead to the principle an-
nounced by this Court, that "[p] ower is a heady thing; and 
history shows that the police acting on their own cannot 
be trusted," 31 must disassociate ourselves from the rosy 
view of law enforcement embraced by the Court of Appeals. 
In view of the fact that general exploratory searches will 
unquestionably occur under- the guise of self-protection, it 
seems perfectly clear that the incentive for such uncon-
stitutiona] police conduct will be materially reduced only 
by vigorous application of the Fourth Amendment ex-
34 367 U. S. at 657. See also, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. at 655 
(1961); Kerv. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963). 
35 See also People v. Pugach, 15 N. Y. 2d 65, 204 N. E. 2d 176 
(1964), cert. den. 380 U.S. 936 (1965); People v. Machel, 234 Cal. 
App. 2d 37, 44 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1st Dist. Ct. of App. 1965), cert. 
den. 382 U.S. 839 (1965); People v. Garrett, 238 Cal. App. 2d 324, 
47 Cal. Rptr. 731 (3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1965). 
36 The Court of Appeals opinion disingenuously notes that "police 
officers seem unanimous in stating that frisking is done for self-
protection and not as a mere evidentiary :fishing expedition." 
37 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). 
32 
clusionary rule. If law enforcement authorities know that 
weapons and other evidence seized during the course of an 
unconstitutional frisk will be suppressed by constitutional 
command, the number of unconstitutional invasions of pri-
vacy will be reduced, at the very least, to those instances 
where the officer genuinely fears for his safety. 
And thus the threat of "stop and frisk" police proce-
dures, another of the new devices "that have emerged from 
century to century wherever excessive power is sought by 
the few at the expense of the many" 38 will be laid to rest. 
CONCLUSION 
Amici have urged the constitutional infirmity of an 
on-the-street detention as an illegal arrest, the invalidity of 
an accompanying "frisk" as an unreasonable search, and 
the barrenness of the attempted justification of both 
in the name of crime prevention and the safety of th~ 
interrogating officer. Despite the clamor of the constabu-
lary to the contrary, the highly critical area of on-the-street 
arrests and accompanying searches demands no relaxation 
of Fourth Amendment standards, but vigorous adherence 
to them. Otherwise, "a method will have been devised by 
which the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against un-
reasonable searches and seizures may be evaded and the 
exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, • • • to a large extent, 
written off the books." 39 
38 Black, J., dissenting in Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 
89 (1947). 
39 Fuld, J., dissenting in People v. Rivera, 14 N. Y. 2d 441, 448, 
201 N. E. 2d 32, 36 (1964). 
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The requirement of probable cause is a compromise which 
has been found for accommodating the citizen's basic right 
to privacy and the need for effective criminal investigation 
and law enforcement. "Requiring more would unduly ham-
per law enforcement. To allow less '\Vould be to leave law-
abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or 
caprice." •0 
If probable cause is to continue to be a workable and use-
ful concept to balance the citizen's right of privacy against 
police necessity, it ought not be relegated to a caricature of 
a stricture against law enforcement excesses, a status which 
must surely follow if police officers, with constitutional 
sanction, are permitted-rather, encouraged-to compel 
suspects, during a period of non-arrest, to disgorge in-
criminating information and evidence which will raise 
their suspicions to probable cause and thereby validate a 
subsequent arrest. It is too late in the day and too de-
structive of constitutional values to attempt to "justify 
the arrest by the search anq at the same time justify the 
search by the arrest." Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 
10, 15 (1947). 
Accordingly, amici join in, and call upon this Court to 
make its own, the stirring language of Judge Fuld: 
" • • • The loss of liberty entailed in authorizing a 
species of search on the basis of mere suspicion is too 
high a price to pay for the small measure of added 
security it promises. Other methods are available 
whereby the police may protect themselves while 
carrying on their investigations, other procedures 
which, if utilized, will safeguard the police and the 
comm.unity from the eriminal minority without de-
"
0 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 (1949). 
34 
stroying the sense of dignity and freedom with which 
the law-abiding majority walk the streets. 
"To what end security if liberty be sacrificed as its 
pricef The privacy which the Constitution guarantees 
is assured to the best of men only if it is vouchsafed to 
the worst, however distasteful that may be. Thus, 
although the defendant before us undoubtedly merits 
the punishment provided by law for carrying a con-
cealed weapon, I venture that it is better that he go 
free than that we sanction a significant inroad on the 
rights of all our citizens." n 
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